centuries. Thus, to Plamenatz, as to many others like him, Constant's value lies not so much in what he has to say about his own times, but in the way "he seems to prophesy rather than describe." When reading Constant, "we think of our own times rather than his." To Plamenatz, it often sounded as if Constant were speaking of Hitler's Germany. 3 Undoubtedly, it is anti-totalitarianism that has been the most powerful magnet drawing political theorists to Constant. Isaiah Berlin is just one among a prominent and growing group of liberals who worry about the "excesses of democratic politics" and the totalitarian potential lurking within. In his famous essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," 4 Berlin warned that the connection between democracy and individual liberty was more tenuous than many of his contemporaries believed. He showcased Constant as one of the first thinkers to realize this and who therefore wisely endorsed a "negative," rather than "positive" conception of freedom. In contrast to theorists like Rousseau, to whom freedom meant the possession of a share in the public power, Constant viewed freedom as "non-interference" or lack of coercion. Having witnessed the French Revolution, and the infernal dynamics that led to the Terror, Constant understood that liberty in the Rousseauean, "positive" sense could easily end up destroying many of the "negative" liberties that both he and Berlin held sacred.
Berlin's interpretation of Rousseau was strongly influenced by the theories of Jacob Talmon. 5 Both Talmon and Berlin understood Rousseau's theory of democracy to be proto-totalitarian. In contrast, Constant knew that one should not automatically equate liberty with democratic participation. Through his own life experiences he had imbibed the important lesson that "democracy can still crush individuals as mercilessly as any previous ruler." 6 Crucially, Constant realized that freedom meant drawing a frontier between the area of a person's private life and that of public authority. This is what made him a much-admired founder of modern liberalism and, indeed, "the most eloquent of all defenders of freedom and privacy." 7 Berlin's essay obviously had a polemical purpose. He himself admitted that his emphasis on negative liberty was due to his fear of twentieth century dictatorships, in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere in the world. By the time he wrote his essay, the main danger was undoubtedly Soviet-style communism; and his goal in writing it was to defend a liberal conception of freedom against contemporary communist thought. With this aim in mind, Berlin focused on those aspects of Constant's argument that could shore up his own. He used Constant to warn of the tendencies modern democratic movements have to become totalitarian. which often seems to suggest that the aim of modern politics should be to contain rather than advance democracy.
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To begin, one would have to say that it is rather odd for Constant to be admired by people who dislike the Revolution so intensely, since Constant dedicated his life to both defending its achievements and promoting its fundamental aims. The truth is that for most of his life, Constant worried much more about reaction, or a return to the past, than he did about the future. Moreover, and in contrast to many of his recent French admirers, Constant's thought was certainly more concerned with advancing democracy than it was with containing it. There is, in fact, little ambivalence about democracy in Stephen Holmes' distrust for contemporary "communitarian cant" than it does about Constant. It is based on a shallow reading of Constant's religious writings 48 and a profound ignorance of his indebtedness to an important tradition of Protestant thought. 49 Another modern commentator who dwells on Constant's supposed "skepticism"
is Biancamaria Fontana, although her purposes for doing so are less easy to determine.
Calling him not only "a natural sceptic," but also "essentially pessimistic," 50 she turns
Constant into an almost tragic prophet of doom and gloom. Fontana especially appreciates what Constant has to say about the "difficulties of the modern condition." She likes the way he denounces "the falsity, sufferings and moral impoverishment of the modern age." 51 She admires him for having realized that the progress towards modern democracy is "a long march through a dark and insidious labyrinth," and for knowing that the journey "would prove more and more adverse as the game went on." 52 To
Fontana, Constant's theories are useful because they are "capable of reminding us of our own unsolved problems, present failings or impending disasters." 53 They strike a chord with all those "who have doubts" about the capacity of political theory to cure society's problems. 54 Such an extraordinarily pessimistic reading of Constant is truly baffling. Once again, it can only be the result of ignoring and/or misreading large portions of Constant's work, in particular, his abundant writings on religion. It seems to betray the influence of an earlier historiographical tradition, one that overemphasized the importance of Constant's novel Adolphe and erroneously equated Constant with its fictional protagonist.
Why such a skeptic and pessimist should dedicate himself to a life of public service is hard to fathom. The point is, once again, that the real, historical Constant was not as gloomy and pessimistic as his many of his modern commentators seem to be.
On the contrary, George Armstrong Kelly, an unusually perceptive reader whose work on Constant has been strangely neglected, noted quite some time ago that he was both pragmatic about politics and optimistic about the future. Moreover, in Kelly's estimation, Constant was actually "an eloquent advocate, but a poor prophet." He was "wrong on a number of things" and even suffered from a "long-range blindness. liberalism." 58 Kelly invited people to pay some attention to the interaction of religion and politics in Constant's thought, a suggestion that has yet to be followed. 59 Indeed, the other scholars reviewed in this essay ignored this side of Constant altogether, leaving us with a picture of Constant that is both dark and distorted. 60 In the case of French scholars like Gauchet and Manent, the neglect of religion is all the more remarkable given the importance attributed to religion in their own theoretical writings. It has been noted that, in France, intellectual history as a discipline is still "in the process of construction." 72 Recent Constant scholarship certainly bears this assessment out. In the main, this field has been the province of political theorists who have treated Constant more as an analytical tool for their own polemical purposes than as a historical subject in his own right. Moreover, these high-profile admirers of Constant suffer from anxieties about modernity and democracy, producing work that tends to be more diagnostic and pessimistic than constructive or promotional. This helps to explain why Constant, although he has certainly benefited from the French "return to politics," has also suffered from a skewed and partial reading. It can only be hoped that new discussions of methodology, already under way in France, 73 will lead to broader and more nuanced treatments. Then perhaps scholars will have a fresh reason to read Constant-they will read him to gain insights into his thought and his world, and not just to see a rather sad reflection of their own.
Present-day theorists need not fear that recovering the historical Constant will somehow diminish his relevance. In fact, I believe the opposite to be true. Others before me have argued convincingly that restoring a thinker to his own context and rhetorical circumstances will actually enhance rather than diminish his present usefulness. 74 It does this by enriching the quality of the dialogue we can have with him or her and by sensitizing us to the broad range of arguments and choices available to us at any given time. More to the point, the careful reconstruction of a world that is in fact quite foreign to us allows us to gain a better perspective on our own. In conclusion, therefore, there is indeed much for us to learn from Constant, but we should begin by approaching him in 
